State Regulation of Peaceful Self-Help Conduct Is Pre-Empted by National Labor Policy - Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission by Dancer, Donald R.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 26 
Issue 3 Spring 1977 Article 12 
State Regulation of Peaceful Self-Help Conduct Is Pre-Empted by 
National Labor Policy - Lodge 76, International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission 
Donald R. Dancer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Donald R. Dancer, State Regulation of Peaceful Self-Help Conduct Is Pre-Empted by National Labor Policy 
- Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission, 26 DePaul L. Rev. 696 (1977) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol26/iss3/12 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
STATE REGULATION OF PEACEFUL SELF-HELP
CONDUCT IS PRE-EMPTED BY NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY-LODGE 76, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS v. WISCONSIN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
Case law has established both general areas of federal pre-emption
over labor disputes' and specific conduct2 regulable by the state. But
where federal regulation ends and state regulation begins still is not
completely clear.' In fact, further adding to the uncertainty, there is an
area of labor conduct which neither the National Labor Relations Board
nor the states can regulate. In Lodge 76, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission,' the Supreme Court found a specific example of this pro-
tected labor activity. Concurrently, the Court delineated a general area
of labor conduct free from any regulation. The majority held that a
refusal to work overtime, which was an activity neither protected nor
prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act,' nevertheless was un-
regulable by the state.' The Court stated that the refusal to work over-
1. See notes 14 & 16 and accompanying text infra.
2. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text infra.
3. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
[Tihe national . . . Act . . . leaves much to the states, though Congress has
refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indica-
tions of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.
Garner v. Teamsters' Local Union 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
4. 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976).
5. For purposes of this Note, the pertinent federal labor acts are the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151-169 (1970), as amended by the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), 29 U.S.C. §§141-44, 151-67, 171-88 (1970), and the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin), 29 U.S.C. §401-
707 (1970). [Hereinafter, these acts are referred to as the "NLRA" or "the Act."].
"Protected" and "prohibited" in this Note relate to the rights of labor and management
under sections seven and eight of the National Labor Relations Act. Section seven of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §157 (1970), guarantees the rights of employees to organize and form
unions and to engage in collective bargaining. These rights are "protected" against inter-
ference. Section eight, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1970), describes various activities on the part of
labor and management which are deemed to be unfair labor practices for the purposes of
the federal acts. These activities are "prohibited" as against labor and management.
6. The Supreme Court specifically overruled its previous decision in UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), commonly referred to and hereinafter
cited as Briggs-Stratton. In the Briggs-Stratton case, the Court permitted state restriction
of conduct that was neither protected nor prohibited by the federal labor laws. The Court
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time was in a class of peaceful self-help conduct that generally was un-
regulable by either state or federal instrumentalities.
In Machinists, union members at a Wisconsin machine tool plant
refused to work overtime in order to put pressure on the employer during
collective bargaining negotiations.' The employer filed unfair labor
practice charges against the union with the NLRB and the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission.' The complaint was dismissed by
the NLRB, which found no conduct prohibited by the National Labor
Relations Act? However, the Wisconsin Employment Relations Com-
mission found the refusal to work overtime violated the state labor stat-
ute and issued a cease-and-desist order. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
found that the conduct, which consisted of repeated calls for employee meetings during
working hours, was coercive, and allowed state jurisdiction in the absence of a clearly
manifested congressional intent to the contrary. Id. at 253. The Briggs-Stratton Court
premised its holding on the statement that, since the conduct was not subject to the Act,
"Itihis conduct is either governable by the state or it is entirely ungoverned." Id. at 254.
The Machinists Court acknowledged that in Briggs-Stratton the Court neglected to ascer-
tain whether the conduct should be left unregulated to the free play of economic forces.
96 S. Ct. at 2553.
7. A bargaining impasse occurred in Machinists when the employer announced he
would impose a 40 hour work week with overtime pay applicable after eight hours per day
and 40 hours per week. The union sought to retain a 37 1/2 hour week and seven and one-
half hour day, with overtime provisions applicable after that time. Workers simply left
after their shifts and refused to volunteer for or accept overtime or Saturday work. Refusal
to work overtime previously had been held to be unprotected activity. See, e.g., John S.
Swift Co. v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Kohler, 220 F.2d 3, 9-10
(7th Cir. 1955); C.G. Conn. Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1939). See also
Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 2548, 2561 n.1 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Dow
Chem. Co., 152 NLRB 1150 (1965).
8. The employer claimed that the refusal to work overtime violated section 8(b)(3) of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(3) (1970), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to "refuse to bargain collectively with an employer." The Wisconsin charge, filed
several days after the NLRB complaint, claimed a violation of §111.06(2)(h) of the Wis-
consin statutes, making it an unfair labor practice for an employee "[tlo take unauthor-
ized possession of the property of an employer or to engage in any concerted effort to
interfere with production .. " Wis. STAT. §111.06(2)(h) (1973). The union activity in
Machinists at no time involved violence or threats of violence.
9. In refusing to file a formal complaint, the NLRB's Regional Director said the conduct
"does not appear to be in violation of the Act" and therefore was not conduct cognizable
by the NLRB under NLRB v. Insurance Agents, Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
Machinists, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 2550 (1976). The Board's dismissal al3o said in part:
Dismissal by this agency does not necessarily preclude the Charging Party from
pursuing its rights under statutes other than the National Labor Relations Act
on matters not covered by said act.
Machinists, 67 Wis.2d 13, 15, 226 N.W.2d 203, 204 (1975). The Wisconsin Supreme Court
took the Regional Director's statement into account in allowing state jurisdiction.
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on appeal, held that no national labor policy prevented the Commis-
sion's action."0
The United States Supreme Court reversed." The Court indicated
that Congress, in enacting the national labor acts, intended that some
activities be available as bargaining tools to labor and management.
The Court said that a refusal to work overtime was within such a class
of economic conduct and therefore was unregulable by either the state
or the NLRB. 2 This Note will analyze the Court's effort to define this
area of unrestricted activity. The Machinists decision will be examined
in light of the Court's attempt to draw guidance from its own pre-
emption decisions.
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND SPECIFIC STATE POWERS
The national labor laws clearly force state acts to yield when there is
a conflict. 3 Under the doctrine of federal pre-emption the states are
ousted from jurisdiction because Congress sought to have the federal
government and its designated agencies comprehensively "occupy the
field.",
10. Machinists, 67 Wis.2d 13, 226 N.W.2d 203 (1975).
11. 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976).
12. Id. at 2557, citing NLRB v. Insurance Agents, Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-500
(1960). In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice, agreed that
the state law should be pre-empted. However, he added that he understood the Court's
decision not to preclude state enforcement of "neutral" statutes. Those laws are not
directed towards the parties' bargaining relations, but have only an incidental effect on
bargaining strength. 96 S. Ct. at 2560-61.
13. The National Labor Relations Act is the primary law regulating the field of labor
relations. Under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, and the Supremacy Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, Congress has derived the authority to legislate in the labor relations
area and to have those enactments supercede similar state statutes. The constitutionality
of the Act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The
NLRB, as constituted, has jurisdiction over all matters which "affect commerce." 29
U.S.C. §151 (1970), defined at 29 U.S.C. §152(7) (1970). That jurisdiction has been
broadly defined. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S.
20 (1953); Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482 (1953); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). If state action conflicts with Board jurisdic-
tion, the states must yield. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1957); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
14. In defining pre-emption, Justice Harlan, in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employ-
ees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), stated
The constitutional principles of pre-emption, in whatever particular field of law
they operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting
regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some author-
ity over the subject matter.
Id. at 285. Under the doctrine of pre-emption, state legislation may be prevented when a
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Specific provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, notably sec-
tions 7 and 8,'1 make certain conduct subject solely to the jurisdiction
of the NLRB. 6 However, the Supreme Court has specified areas in
which states are left with residual police powers to regulate conduct
affecting the health, safety, and welfare of the populace. 7 For example,
the states generally have retained the power to halt or prevent violence
which accompanies a labor dispute, provided that the state action is
directed only to that violence or intimidation."8 The police power also
federal act already comprehensively regulates the field. State law must defer to the com-
petence of the NLRB when the conduct falls under the provisions of the NLRA. In the
NLRA statement of policy, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1970), the purpose of the Act was to safeguard
the economy of the country by the application of one federal law to labor relations dis-
putes. Whether or not that pre-emption exists largely depends on the Court's interpreta-
tion of congressional intent.
15. See note 5 supra. The pre-emption doctrine recognizes that any activity arguably
subject to sections seven or eight of the Act is prevented from state interference. Further,
the pre-emption doctrine acknowledges that it is not for the states or the federal courts to
determine whether an activity is covered by the provisions of sections seven or eight. The
Supreme Court expressed this concept of pre-emption in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), in which the Court stated:
When an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act, the
States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of
the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with
national policy is to be averted ....
[11n the absence of the Board's clear determination that an activity is neither
protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially undis-
puted facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such activities are subject
to state jurisdiction.
359 U.S. at 245-46.
16. The NLRB, under the reasoning of the Garmon decision, has primary jurisdiction
over cases arguably subject to the NLRA. Once the Board has determined that conduct
is subject to its jurisdiction, other governmental units are pre-empted. This primary
jurisdiction notion of pre-emption allows the NLRB to take jurisdiction over most labor
disputes. For a discussion of primary jurisdiction, see generally Come, Federal Pre-
emption in Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of
Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435 (1970); Hays, State Courts and Federal Pre-emption, 23 Mo.
L. REV. 373 (1958); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over
Labor Relations: I, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1959).
17. This residue of state powers is derived from the state's "historic powers over such
traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of streets and highways."
Allen Bradley, Local 111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749
(1942); See also Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
18. See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (union's malicious interference with
employee's lawful occupation); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (evidence that
abuse, insults, and epithets involved with picketing likely to produce violence); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (union agent's threats
and intimidation directed towards contractor).
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extends to enforcement of tort actions'" and some breach of contract
actions between labor and management." In addition, the San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon"' decision indicated that the states
could act when the conduct was insubstantial and local in character or
when application of neutral state law would have only a peripheral
impact on labor relations."2
UNREGULABLE SELF-HELP CONDUCT
The Supreme Court also has recognized that some conduct cannot be
regulated by either the state or federal agencies. 2 In Machinists, the
crucial inquiry was whether Congress intended not to regulate certain
conduct, leaving it to be controlled by "the free play of economic
forces."2 The Machinists Court reasoned that refusal to work overtime
was within a category of permissible economic weapons that Congress
19. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 45 U.S.L.W. 4263
(March 7, 1977) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (malicious libel).
20. See, e.g., William Arnold Co. v. Carpenter's Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974)
(breach of "no strike" clause in collective bargaining agreement); Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (failure to comply with grievance arbitration procedure
in agreement).
21. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
22. Id. at 243-44. However, the Court has set aside broad state statutes which have
an impact on labor relations. See, e.g., McCrary v. Aladdin Radio Co., 355 U.S. 8 (1957);
Teamsters, Local 327 v. Kerrigan Iron Works, 353 U.S. 968 (1957).
The states also have been granted jurisdiction over labor matters by specific congres-
sional enactment. For example, under section 14(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §164(b)
(1970), states can restrict union security agreements by applying substantive laws which
are commonly referred to as right-to-work laws. See, e.g., Retail Clerks, Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963). Under section 14(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §164(c)
(1970), the Board may decline jurisdiction over cases concerning labor disputes not sub-
stantially affecting commerce. Under section 14(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. §164(c)(2) (1970), the
states can assert jurisdiction over these cases which the Board declines generally for failure
to meet its jurisdictional standards. These standards are expressed in general terms of
dollar volume by industry. See, e.g., Acme Paper Box Co., 201 NLRB 32 (1973) (retail
concerns with annual business over $500,000); Trico Disposal Service, Inc., 191 NLRB 17
(1971) (national defense). Other congressional grants of power to states include cession
agreements under section 10(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §160(a) (1970), and certain ac-
tions allowing damage awards for unfair labor practices under section 303 of the Act, 29
U.S.C. §187 (1970).
23. The Supreme Court, in UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
245, 254, (1949) acknowledged that some conduct was entirely ungoverned. The Court
reiterated this view in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 347 U.S. 485, 488 (1953). The
dictum of Garner indicated that these ungoverned activities were as important to labor
balance as those activities specifically protected under the NLRA. Id. at 500.
24. 96 S.Ct. at 2553, citing NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971).
[Vol. 26:696
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intended to be free of governmental interference. 5 The majority found
that neither the states nor the NLRB should be able to upset the balance
of bargaining strength between labor and management which Congress
created. That balance was evidenced by the congressional enactments
which protected some conduct, prohibited other conduct, and left other
conduct to the free play of economic forces. The Court concluded that
state regulation of this unrestricted conduct would conflict with the
congressional intent. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court relied
heavily on its previous reasoning in NLRB v. Insurance Agents Interna-
tional Union 2 and Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton."
In Insurance Agents, the Supreme Court found that concerted harass-
ing tactics by employees were not contrary to the union's duty to bargain
in good faith. 8 Therefore, the NLRB was prevented by the Court from
25. This activity, intended to be left unregulated, is generally in the nature of self-help
or partial strike conduct which is employed by both labor and management to persuade
each to agree to contract terms. This class of activity includes general slowdowns, Phelps
Dodge Copper Prod. Corp., 101 NLRB 360 (1952), Elk Lumber Co., 91 NLRB 333 (1950);
attacks on the employer's product, NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953);
concerted rejections of optional though requested assignments, Memphis Moldings, Inc.,
164 NLRB 524 (1967); refusal to cross picket lines at a customer's premises, Redwing
Carriers, Inc., 137 NLRB 1545 (1962), enforced, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963); and certain
disloyalty measures, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). In at-
tempting to ascertain the federal role over such activities, the policy is that Congress did
not consider such conduct as neutral, but rather as conduct "to be assimilated to the large
residual area in which the regime of free collective bargaining or economic warfare is
thought to be in the course of regulatory wisdom." Lesnick, Pre-emption Reconsidered:
The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 469, 480 (1972). Because
Congress intended that this conduct be available to bargaining parties, it is often seen as
"protected" by the Act. Professor Cox has suggested that this unrestricted self-help con-
duct be called "permitted," because it is protected against governmental, but not em-
ployer, interference. Cox, Labor Law Pre-emption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1338, 1346
(1972). For a discussion of the "protected" status of partial strike activity as a result of
Machinists see Getman, The Protected Status of Partial Strikes After Lodge 76: A
Comment, 29 STA. L. REv. 205 (1977).
26. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
27. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
28. The employer in Insurance Agents charged the union members with a violation of
section 8(b)(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(3) (1970), which is a refusal to bargain
collectively by the union. The NLRB found a violation, and considered the union's contin-
ued participation in negotiations to be less than seriously pursued while the harassment
continued. 119 NLRB 768, 771 (1957). The Supreme Court overturned the NLRB's find-
ings. The justices found
[Alt the present stage of our national labor relations policy, the two fac-
tors-necessity for good faith bargaining between parties, and the availability
of economic pressure devices to each to make the other party incline to agree to
one's terms-exist side by side.
361 U.S. at 489.
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attempting to interfere with the economic pressure tactics. The self-help
actions included refusal to solicit new business, refusal to comply with
company business procedures, periodically reporting late for work, sit-
ins, distribution of literature, and leaving in groups at noon.9 The Su-
preme Court stated that these self-help tools were intended to be avail-
able to labor and management in bargaining for contract terms. 0 It
reasoned that NLRB regulation could result in too much government
influence over the substantive terms of collective bargaining agree-
ments. The Court concluded that the national labor policy was not
premised on the basis that the government should control the results of
negotiations."1
In Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton,32 the Supreme Court pre-empted
application of state law to peaceful secondary boycott activity. A union
violated section 303 of the NLRA13 by encouraging employees of a cus-
tomer to force their management to cease doing business with the struck
employer.3 Compensatory damages for business losses were awarded to
the employer for this violation of section 303. The union also violated
Ohio state law by encouraging the management of a second customer
to cease doing business with the struck employer." Punitive damages
29. 361 U.S. at 480-81.
30. In allowing the self-help actions, the Court quoted from Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959), which held that a state anti-trust statute could
not be applied to negate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement setting wage rates.
The Insurance Agents court accepted the Oliver notion that "Congress intended that the
parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental
power to regulate the substantive solution of their differences." 361 U.S. at 488, citing
Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 295.
31. 361 U.S. at 490. The Insurance Agents Court expressed a concern that,
if the Board could regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used
as part of collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable
influence upon the terms on which the parties contract.
Id. Self-help weapons aid in making parties agree to bargaining terms. If states control
the conduct, the parties cannot force contract settlements. Thus, the government may be
forced to enter the negotiations to persuade the parties to agree to terms. For this reason,
the Agents Court prevented the NLRB from asserting its authority to try to distinguish
among economic weapons or to equalize disparities of bargaining power. Id. at 490. Fear
of NLRB interference had previously been expressed by Congress. See S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGE-
MENT REiATIONS AcT, 1947, at 408 (1974).
32. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
33. Section 303 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §187 (1970), provides for damages against unions
engaged in certain unfair labor practices.
34. 29 U.S.C. §187(a) (1970).
35. This conduct violated Ohio common law, which the Court said prohibits "making
direct appeals to a struck employer's customers or suppliers to stop doing business with
the struck employer." Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 255 (1964). The
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were assessed against the union. The Supreme Court found that section
303, which leaves a union free to peacefully persuade the management
of a customer to boycott the struck employer, might be frustrated by the
state's prohibition of the same activity." Because Congress had
"occupied the field" by comprehensively regulating secondary boycotts,
the Court reasoned that congressional failure to prohibit the conduct
indicated an intent that it be permissible self-help action. 7 Therefore,
the damage award in Morton was confined to the specifically limited
provisions of section 303.
The Machinists Court used the findings in Insurance Agents and
Morton as justification for holding the refusal to work overtime to be
unregulable. In Insurance Agents, the Court was concerned that the
NLRB might become too closely involved in the collective bargaining
sphere." The Court in Machinists, fearing a similar influence by the
Wisconsin agency, pre-empted the state jurisdiction.3' While the major-
ity in Machinists claims merely to have applied the principle of
peaceful approach to a customer's management did not violate any provisions of the
federal Act.
36. The Morton majority stated:
[E]ven though it may be assumed that at least some of the secondary activity
here involved was neither protected nor prohibited, it is still necessary to deter-
mine whether by enacting §303, "Congress occupied the field and closed it to
state regulation. ... The basic question . . . is whether "in a case such as
this, incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal
labor law.". . . The answer to that question ultimately depends upon whether
the application of state law . . . would serve to frustrate the purpose of the
federal legislation.
377 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added). That frustration would be the state's regulation of an
activity Congress meant to leave unregulated. The emphasis in Morton on the necessity
of seeing whether state regulation would frustrate the Act by interfering with an area
closed by Congress had been upheld by the Supreme Court prior to the Machinists deci-
sion. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969). For a discussion of Morton, see
Ratner, Damage Actions and the Impact of the Morton Case, 18TH ANN. N.Y.U. CONF. ON
LABOR 117 (1966).
37. The Court reasoned that Congress struck a balance in bargaining strength between
labor and management, and that allowing the use of self-help was part of that balance.
The justices then found that,
if the Ohio law of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the same
type of conduct Congress focused upon but did not proscribe when it enacted
§303, the inevitable result would be to frustrate the congressional determination
to leave this weapon of self-help available, and to upset the balance of power
between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy.
377 U.S. at 259-60. (emphasis added).
38. See note 31 supra.
39. 96 S. Ct. at 2555.
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Insurance Agents to the refusal to work overtime, the conclusions which
they drew from that opinion seem overstated.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Machinists points out that Insurance
Agents did not resolve the broad question whether self-help conduct was
unregulable because of some legislative intent."0 Rather, the Insurance
Agents Court focused on a discussion of whether the union activity
violated the duty to bargain in good faith under section 8(b)(3).11 In
addition, Justice Stevens limited the holding in Insurance Agents to the
statement that the NLRB could not regulate the self-help conduct. He
stated that the prohibition did not extend to the states. Justice Stevens
reasoned in Machinists that simply because Congress denied the NLRB
power to regulate the particular self-help conduct, this "hardly amounts
to withdrawal of the same power from the States."" Following Justice
Stevens' analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly interpreted
Insurance Agents as only precluding NLRB regulation of self-help tac-
tics. 3 However, the response to this argument is that if the NLRB can-
not assert jurisdiction to distinguish among various economic weapons,
then the states, which have even less labor expertise, should also be
precluded." The NLRB is the expert agency designated by Congress to
adjudicate labor disputes.4"
The Machinists majority also may have overstated the Court's hold-
ing in Morton. In Morton, the Court found that Congress had intended
section 303 to prohibit a specific form of self-help conduct while leaving
40. Id. at 2562, n.3.
41. See note 31 supra.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 2562, n.2.
43. Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 67 Wis.2d 13, 226 N.W.2d 203 (1975). The Wisconsin Supreme Court said
Insurance Agents "merely holds that the NLRB had no power to regulate strike tactics
and left regulation of strike tactics to the states." 67 Wis.2d at 18, 226 N.W.2d at 207.
44. The Machinists majority said the Court's prior decisions indicate a congressional
intent that the activities were not to be regulable by the states any more than by the
NLRB. 96 S.Ct. at 2557. The majority also found that the decisions "made it abundantly
clear that state attempts to influence the terms of collective-bargaining agreements are
as inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme as are such attempts by the NLRB."
Id. at 2559.
45. The Court noted in Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), that
in creating the national labor scheme Congress
did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal
competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confide primary
interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted
tribunal. ...
Id. at 490-91. The NLRB is empowered to apply the national labor act provisions, includ-
ing the prevention of unfair labor practices by labor or management. 29 U.S.C. §160(a)
(1970).
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open other forms of such activity not specifically prohibited under that
section."8 But in Machinists, the Court decided that the refusal to work
overtime was permitted even though Congress had never found that
regulation of self-help would upset any bargaining balance', or had simi-
larly occupied that field of activity. 8 The Machinists dissenters would
have been willing to follow the majority had Congress actually focused
on the refusal to work overtime or similar conduct and decided to leave
it unregulated. But they saw no legislative authority which would allow
the Court to apply the Morton inference of "frustration of national labor
policy" to pre-empt incompatible state action." It is difficult to ascer-
tain exactly what legislative expressions were the basis for the majority
opinion. With the exception of Morton, the Court's decisions on self-
help conduct are based more on broadly-interpreted ideas of balance
and public policy than on actual authority in the legislative history.
46. See notes 36 & 37 supra. A leading scholar has stated that the failure of the Congress
to prohibit an activity, as in Morton, should create a negative inference that the conduct
was proper and even desirable. When the state outlaws conduct which federal law fails to
outlaw, it is seen as denying one party an economic weapon Congress meant to be avail-
able. See Lesnick, supra note 25, at 472-80.
47. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, stated that he had "found no legislative expression
of any such intent nor any evidence that Congress had scrutinized such activity." 96 S.Ct.
at 2561.
48. See note 50 supra. The only expression of legislative intent noted by the union in
Machinists was discussion of a House bill during passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
However, Justice Stevens said the refusal to work overtime was not related to that bill's
proscription of interference with the employer by remaining on the premises. 96 S.Ct. at
2561 n.2.
49. 96 S.Ct. at 2561.
50. Justice Harlan, in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 289 (1971), admitted that the precise extent to which state law had to be displaced
for the sake of the national acts was never determined by Congress, a situation making it
difficult for the Court to make its decisions. Despite the Machinists majority's claim that
the decision was based on the congressional intent, there is simply no clear legislative
history making the refusal to work overtime in a class of unregulable activity. The only
relevant consideration was in H.R. 3020, which was passed by the House as part of the
1947 labor acts amendments. The key section of the bill was section 12(a)(3)(A), which
made it unlawful for "calling, authorizing, engaging in, or assisting . . . any sit-down
strike or other concerted interference with the employer's operations conducted by re-
maining on the premises." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §12(a)(3)(A) (1947) see H. RP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, 43-44 (1947). Section 12 was ultimately rejected by
the Joint Conference Committee. The union in Machinists argued that section 12 was
similar to the Wisconsin law invoked against the union. The fact that section 12 was
deleted was considered an indication that Congress intended that the activity be unre-
stricted. The employer took the view that section 12 was inapplicable, because the em-
ployees in Machinists did not remain on the premises. They had, in fact, refused to remain
for what the employer considered a full day. However, this section could have been deleted
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Thus, Machinists expands Morton by finding pre-emption even as to
conduct not scrutinized by Congress."
THE RESULTING No MAN'S LAND
The result of Machinists' broad interpretation of Insurance Agents
and Morton is the creation of a conduct "no man's land."52 Self-help
conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited by the federal labor act
is now pre-empted against state and federal regulation by some unex-
pressed legislative intent.5" The Agents decision would prevent any as-
sertion of jurisdiction by the NLRB; Machinists applies the same prohi-
because Congress did not wish to give this self-help activity protection. In any event, there
was no persuasive legislative history indicating that the refusal to work overtime was
unregulable conduct. Morton had a firm basis in the legislative deliberations, largely
based on what the Court saw as the comprehensiveness of the statute. The Morton Court
stated that section 303 comprehensively and with great particularity describes and regu-
lates specific labor conduct. No comprehensive legislation was available in Machinists.
51. The holding in Machinists could have been limited to the refusal to work overtime,
and not expanded to infer that all previously undefined self-help may be free from regula-
tion. The majority quotes the broad language of Insurance Agents to make the decision
applicable to any self-help activity. The Court stated that "[o]ur decisions hold that
Congress meant that these activities. . . were not to be regulable by States any more than
by the NLRB . . . ." 96 S. Ct. at 2557. Refusal to work overtime is cast with the other
undefined self-help tools. The Machinists holding also could have limited Briggs-Stratton
to the facts of that case, as Justice Stevens suggests, without expressly overruling it. In
Briggs-Stratton, there was some evidence of possible violence or property damage.
State jurisdiction could have been asserted solely on that basis. One rationale for the
Court's potentially broad application of Machinists is a desire by the Court to avoid
continuing to try labor disputes on a case-by-case basis. In Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), Justice Harlan expressed the view that the
Court could not continue to determine cases involving possible conflicts with federal law
on a case-by-case basis. He suggested that "this Court is ill-equipped" to decide these
cases and that there should be a rule of "relatively easy application" so that states could
police themselves. Id. at 289-90. Perhaps the holding of Machinists is an attempt by the
Court to provide an easy pre-emption rule.
52. The "no man's land" notion had previously been acknowledged by the Court in
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), to apply to situations in which the
NLRB refused or failed to act in a labor dispute, while at the same time the pre-emption
doctrine prevented state action. The Garner Court said this situation exposed a "vast, no
man's land, subject to regulation by no agency or court." Id. at 491. The Machinists Court
creates a new "no man's land" where conduct not subject to the Act also is not subject to
state jurisdiction. Further, there is an unclear legislative assertion that the conduct re-
main entirely unregulated in all cases. The result is a situation in which almost any
previously undefined self-help action, even involving conduct which could have been
regulated by the state because of the activity's insubstantial effect on commerce, is pre-
cluded from adjudication by any governmental entity. A "no man's land" is created in
which parties facing self-help conduct have no tribunal to adjudicate the labor dispute.
53. 96 S.Ct. at 2555, citing Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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bition to the states."' Apparently, the Machinists Court felt that regula-
tion of virtually any self-help conduct could create a bargaining imbal-
ance. 5
The "no man's land" problem also is compounded by the fact that
neither the NLRB nor the states can attempt to more clearly define
what conduct may be regulable.m Presumably, only the Congress, or the
Supreme Court interpreting congressional intent, can define what con-
stitutes self-help activity or what guidelines should be used by desig-
nated agencies in determining whether the conduct is regulable.57
The pre-emption test emerging from Machinists offers little guidance
to states in determining whether an activity can be regulated. The
Machinists determination of pre-emption adopts a test applied in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.58 The
crucial inquiry is whether "[tihe exercise of plenary state authority to
curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate the effective imple-
mentation of the Act's processes."" That "frustration" would be the
creation of any imbalance in the relative bargaining strength of labor
and management. While the dissenters commented that the refusal to
work overtime was too insignificant an activity to upset any perceived
bargaining balance, 0 the majority disagreed. The Machinists majority
makes it clear that neither the states nor the NLRB may attempt to
54. Id. at 2557. The Machinists Court cites Insurance Agents in applying the pre-
emption standard to the states.
55. Id. at 2557. The Machinists Court observed that the Morton decision noted that
"Congress struck the balance . ..between the uncontrolled power of management and
labor to further their respective interests." Id. at 2556, citing Local 20, Teamsters v.
Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1964). Professor Cox, .in discussing that balance concept,
has observed:
An appreciation of the true character of the national labor policy expressed in
the NLRA and LMRA indicates that in providing a legal framework for union
organization, collective bargaining, and the conduct of labor disputes, Congress
struck a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez faire in respect to union
organization, collective bargaining, and labor disputes that would be upset if a
state could also enforce statutes or rules of decision resting upon its views con-
cerning accommodation of the same interests.
Cox, supra note 25 at 1352. The Machinists Court saw the refusal to work overtime as
unregulable activity that would upset a perceived congressional balance if regulated.
56. See note 22 supra. Some of thiis self-help conduct-could have so insignificant an
impact on labor relations that it could be regulable by the states under the Garmon
decision or the specific powers granted to the states by Congress.
57. See note 74 infra.
58. 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
59. Id. at 380.
60. 96 S. Ct. at 2562.
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influence terms of a collective bargaining agreement by regulating the
conduct of the parties to the bargaining negotiations.' The Machinists
Court sought to have bargaining agreements controlled by and left to
free economic forces, not to government entities introducing their own
balancing standards.2 In the future, any state agency considering juris-
diction will be burdened by the possibility that any regulation of labor
activity will create some imbalance that will "frustrate" the national
labor act. 3
CONCLUSION
After Machinists, a residual problem is: what conduct not previously
scrutinized by Congress or the Supreme Court may be regulated by the
states and what options does an employer have when faced with union
activity falling within the conduct "no man's land"? The problem of
ascertaining the role of the states in future labor disputes arises from
the inability of the individual members of the Court to agree on the
legislative intent of Congress regarding self-help activity." Thus,
Machinists may leave states with virtually no jurisdiction over labor
relations disputes involving peaceful partial strike activity. 5 Yet a ma-
jority of the current Court would allow at least some role for the states.
The three dissenters would allow state action in the absence of a con-
gressional mandate. In addition, Justice Powell and the Chief Justice
emphasized in their concurrence that states still should be allowed to
apply neutral state laws and the traditional state powers. 6 At any rate,
the party who faces self-help tactics which have not previously been
scrutinized has no forum to hear his case and only vague interpretations
61. Id. at 2554, citing NLRB v. Insurance Agents, Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
62. 96 S. Ct. at 2557.
63. There may well be a "chilling effect" on the exercise of state jurisdiction even when
state jurisdiction may be warranted. Since regulation of nearly any self-help action argu-
ably can create some imbalance, state agencies may simply decline to assert jurisdiction
over all cases which involve self-help activity.
64. See discussion of Insurance Agents and Morton decisions, notes 40-43 and notes 46-
50 and accompanying text supra.
65. Neither the States nor the Board are "afforded flexibility in picking and choosing
which economic devices of labor and management would be branded as unlawful." 96 S.
Ct. at 2557. The Court has left the states with very limited jurisdiction over peaceful labor
matters out of a fear that state action might frustrate the federal scheme.
66. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra. The three newest members of the
Court, Justices Powell, Rehinquist, and Stevens, all would allow for a state role in labor
relations disputes.
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of congressional intent to define the limits in which the conduct must
remain .
A difficulty in Machinists was that the refusal to work overtime had
never been closely analyzed by either Congress or the Supreme Court.
It is not clear whether Congress, by its silence, intended to permit the
activity8 or whether it simply felt that a refusal to work overtime was
too minor an activity to merit the attention of the legislature. 9 Perhaps
Congress assumed that unions had abandoned such harassment tech-
niques.70 What is more likely is that Congress had no real understanding
of how the pre-emption doctrine would apply or of the problems in-
volved in finding the proper role for the states.7'
In the absence of any creative assistance from the NLRB,72 the
Court,13 or Congress,74 employers and unions will have no legal recourse
67. At some point in the future, the Court may have to define the boundaries of self-
help activities to ascertain at what point self-help weapons may create too great a bargain-
ing imbalance through their continued use. A party facing self-help tactics has no indica-
tion for how long he will have to face such activity or what damages he may have to suffer
before there can be relief.
68. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
69. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, was not persuaded that partial strike activity was
so essential to the bargaining process that states should not be free to make the conduct
illegal. 96 S.Ct. at 2562.
70. Cox, supra note 25, at 1347. Professor Cox said that a failure by Congress to prohibit
this activity did not mean unions could use the tactics. He attributed congressional silence
to "the happy circumstance that no prohibition was urgently required because American
labor unions have almost unanimously rejected such tactics." Id.
71. See note 3 supra. The Congress, if indeed it was actually aware of the pre-emption
problem, left the resolution of the problem to the Court.
72. The Insurance Agents decision prevents the Board from attempting to clarify signif-
icantly the self-help area. However, the Board might make use of its advisory opinion
power to indicate its reasons for refusing to assert jurisdiction over cases involving self-
help conduct. The Board is empowered to make rules and regulations for carrying out its
granted powers. 29 U.S.C. §156 (1970). At present, the Board, in section 102.98 of its Rules
and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §102.98 (1976), provides for Advisory Opinions. These opinions
are limited to jurisdictional questions and not the substantive merits of the case. See, e.g.,
Casida and Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 152 NLRB 526 (1965); Spears-Dehner and
Local 297, Teamsters, 139 NLRB 922 (1962). However, the Board could expand its advi-
sory opinion procedure to more clearly specify why jurisdiction over a labor dispute is or
should be denied, while keeping within the restrictions of Insurance Agents. Had the
NLRB in Machinists been more specific in its reasons for declining jurisdiction, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court might not have misinterpreted the Board's determination. The
Machinists majority would allow for a case-by-case adjudication by the NLRB which may
result in partial strike self-help being "protected" within the meaning of section seven of
the NLRA. 96 S. Ct. at 2559 n. 14. In that event, such activity would even be protected
from employer interference.
73. In Lockridge, the Court recognized that the pre-emption principle "was born of this
Court's efforts, without the aid of explicit congressional guidance." 403 U.S. at 286. The
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to determine the validity or fairness of the other side's bargaining weap-
ons. If unions resort to conduct like that in Machinists, employers will
have to use countervailing economic weapons."5 Such retaliatory con-
duct could include lockouts and discharges of employees.7" Presumably,
these economic weapons will balance each other if the equality of bar-
gaining strength which the Court says Congress created exists. However,
if there is an imbalance in bargaining strength to the detriment of one
of the parties, the holding in Machinists indicates that the state should
not step in to regulate the conduct because its actions would provide an
additional bargaining weapon to one side." To do so would put the state
in a position to favor one party over another." Thus the state could
Court could continue to develop pre-emption as to individual self-help conduct on a case-
by-case basis. But the Court may not have the inclination to continue to address the issue
using the case-by-case approach. See note 51 supra.
74. As with other areas involving the interpretation of the Act, the ultimate solution
for the self-help problem should come from Congress. The Court has previously stated that
it is the responsibility of Congress to "strike the balance" of the parties' respective inter-
ests. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 392
(1969); Local 1976, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958). Con-
gress might amend the NLRA to provide guidelines for governing self-help conduct.
75. The Machinists Court found that "self-help is of course also the prerogative of the
employer because he too may properly employ economic weapons." 96 S.Ct. at 2556. The
majority believed that the employer in Machinists turned to the state agency because it
was unable to overcome the union's tactics with economic self-help weapons of its own.
Id. at 2557. The employer argued that implementation of economic self-help "would only
have increased its already enormous production problems [and] exacerbated the already
substantial strain on the bargaining process. ... 96 S. Ct. at 2557 n.9 citing Brief for
Respondent Kearney & Trecker Corp., at 24 n.36.
76. 96 S.Ct. at 2558-2559. The employer in Machinists could have locked out the em-
ployees or hired replacements solely to bring economic pressure against the union. See
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1969); American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S. 300 (1965). See also Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J.
319, 339 (1951); Getman, Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the NLRA, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1236 (1967). Professor Schatzki suggests the possibility of a "partial
lockout" which would include reduction of wages or a decrease in beneficial working con-
ditions. Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-"Pro-
tected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 378, 382 (1969). In NLRB v. Brown Food
Stores, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), the Court said, "the employer can blunt the effectiveness of
strike activity by stockpiling inventories, readjusting schedules, and transferring work."
Id. at 283.
77. 96 S.Ct. at 2557. The Machinists Court stated that "the economic weakness of the
affected party cannot justify state aid contrary to federal law -.. " The Court believed
that an imbalance would be created by providing an additional weapon to put pressure
on the union, namely state action. This governmental aid would otherwise be unavailable
under the federal scheme.
78. A state trying to acquire more industry, for example, could create a more favorable
business environment by severely limiting the self-help conduct of labor unions.
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exercise considerable influence over the terms to which the parties ulti-
mately contract.7
The employer, forced by the "no man's land" to retaliate with eco-
nomic weapons, takes the chance of escalating the labor dispute. Ulti-
mately, this conduct may be the basis of an unfair labor practice charge
brought against the employer. 0 It is possible that the union could delib-
erately provoke the conduct in order to bring the charge."' Thus, the
Machinists decision could encourage escalation of labor disputes, which
is hardly a result in accord with the labor acts' stated purpose to encour-
age labor harmony.2 This danger of escalation, however, is outweighed
in the minds of the current Court by the danger of a bargaining imbal-
ance created by state regulation of self-help activity. After Machinists,
the states are pre-empted if there is any chance of "frustrating" the
national act. It remains to be seen whether the Court will define more
clearly what state regulation actually would "frustrate" the national
labor scheme, or whether the Court will leave the pre-emption doctrine
in its present confusing form.
Donald R. Dancer
79. 96 S.Ct. at 2554, citing the rationale of Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
80. The employer, if unable to balance the economic self-help of the union with the tools
available to him, may take actions which become unfair labor practices under section
eight of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1970). His responses to union activity, if of a more
substantial nature than self-help harassment, may, for example, violate section 8(a)(1)
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1), which makes it an unfair labor practice to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their section seven rights.
81. The employer may well resort to particular conduct to deliberately provoke an
unfair labor practice charge. He may prefer forcing the issue before the Board to a long
and costly battle of widespread economic weapons.
82. In the labor acts' declaration of policy, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1970), a stated purpose of
the Act is to encourage "practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, and other working conditions." The
Supreme Court recognized that a purpose was "to substitute collective bargaining for
economic warfare in securing satisfactory wages, hours of work, and employment condi-
tions." Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 284 (1956). It is difficult to see how
prolonged use of self-help conduct could further friendly industrial relations.
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